Op Broken Accord 03 - 2026/08/29

Situation

During OP 02, British forces gained access to the KDF communications network and confirmed continued KGC use of military systems. Several KGC personnel were detained, and a recovered phone contained a message associated with the individual known as “Bashir”. A separate laptop had been wiped and yielded no recoverable data.

The attempt to return Karim Ismail to Kamira Renewal failed after the movement was compromised. British personnel withdrew under fire, leaving Ismail and accompanying Kamira Renewal personnel behind. Ismail may have been killed during the subsequent engagement or taken by KGC forces. His status remains unknown, and communications obtained through the KDF network have provided no confirmation.

Traffic recovered during OP 02 and subsequent exploitation of the KDF communications network confirms that President Samir Noor was killed during an attack on the evacuated government party. Initial KDF reporting suggests that gunmen breached his residence in the city of Incirkli and killed him. Malik Omar warned Foreign Affairs Minister Idris Aden and directed him to leave Al Safyrah with a protection team selected by Omar once Noor’s death became known. Aden was last observed leaving Al Safyrah under the protection of loyal KDF personnel, corroborated by intercepted KDF traffic and intelligence recovered from KGC personnel. Communications from his escort ceased shortly afterwards, assessed as a deliberate measure to conceal their movement while seeking a secure location. It remains unknown whether Aden remains under loyal KDF protection, is travelling independently, or has since been captured by a KGC element or hostile KDF personnel.

Intercepted traffic indicates that General Malik Omar arranged a meeting with Defence Cabinet Secretary Yusuf Gedi near Al Nabq, away from established KDF positions, after learning of President Noor’s death. Omar is believed to have departed for the meeting, which may already be under way. His message identifies continuity of government, the breakdown of the KDF chain of command, and the KGC attacks against KDF personnel and the peace talks as matters requiring immediate resolution, referring to the latter as “the Musa breach.” A message recovered from KGC personnel states that a concealed team is waiting near Al Nabq for confirmation of Omar’s arrival. The message was received from “Bashir” and indicates that the KGC is aware of the planned meeting. The timing, concealment and instructions issued to the KGC team indicate hostile intent. It is assessed as likely that the team is preparing to intercept Omar once his arrival is confirmed, although it may also be attempting to identify or confirm Gedi’s attendance.

Following last light, ISTAR monitored remaining hostile KDF forces withdrawing north from Al Tabqah towards Al Quisa, assessed to be regrouping with aligned KDF elements in the area, consolidating hostile forces within the valley.

During OP 01, Hafir Command transmitted Omar’s stand-down order to KDF air-defence and coastal weapon personnel and attempted to dispatch a senior officer when the order was ignored. Hafir Command has been identified as the KDF headquarters at Dayr Hafir, and contact with the site has been lost. Recent ISTAR observed KDF and KGC personnel operating alongside one another outside the main gates while vehicles were loaded and unloaded. KGC elements subsequently departed the area. This coordination confirms that the headquarters is occupied by KDF personnel cooperating with the KGC and is designated hostile. This designation applies to the Dayr Hafir headquarters and does not extend to the wider KDF. The site is assessed to retain command records, intelligence holdings and communications material capable of identifying how lawful KDF authority was displaced and which formations now support the hostile command structure.

KDF and KGC forces operating around Dayr Hafir are likely to exploit the British focus north around Al Quisa by manoeuvring south towards Al Tabqah. The bridges marked OBJ Mandate Alpha, Bravo and Charlie support movement from the headquarters area towards the city. Their demolition will temporarily isolate hostile forces around Dayr Hafir and force any advance to use slower alternative routes, allowing British forces to maintain operations around Al Quisa without overstretching resources to defend Al Tabqah and COP Jasim.

Acknowledgements

• Refer to the situation report for detailed information on known factions and identification images.
• KDF forces are fragmented; only identified hostile positions are authorised for engagement.
  
• Civilian air traffic remains active. Long-range KDF air defence is assessed to remain under government control.

Commanders intent

The intent of this operation is to intervene against the KGC action targeting General Malik Omar and disrupt hostile KDF-KGC activity at the headquarters in Dayr Hafir. Success will see the KGC element at Al Nabq intercepted, Omar secured and escorted to a protected location from which he can re-establish command over responsive KDF formations, and the hostile command function at Dayr Hafir disrupted while intelligence concerning KDF and KGC operations is recovered.

Tasking(s)

Map - Overview

Plan Ops - Preview | Viewer (Read only)

40 Commando & 47 Commando

• [OBJ Watchmen] Rapidly deploy to Al Nabq, search the three identified points of interest and locate General Malik Omar.
• [OBJ Watchman] Neutralise the KGC interception team(s) and secure Omar and any government personnel present.
• [OBJ Mandate] Assault the hostile KDF-KGC headquarters at Dayr Hafir, detain surviving occupants and recover command records, communications equipment and intelligence.
• [OBJ Mandate Alpha] Clear the bridge approaches and prepare the bridge for demolition.
• [OBJ Mandate Bravo] Clear hostile forces and demolish the bridge.
• [OBJ Mandate Charlie] Clear hostile forces and demolish the bridge.
• Coordinate all demolitions to preserve friendly withdrawal routes and avoid isolating friendly forces.

2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment

• [KDF Regroup] Prepare to provide support to UKCF with blocking actions against KDF reinforcements
• Be on standby for rapid deployment to different Area of Operations as the operation evolves.

Joint Aviation Command

• Resupply one times Coyote at COP Jasim before the operation begins.
• [OBJ Watchman] Infil one times strike team from 40 Commando to the Area of Operation containing OBJ Watchman.
• [OBJ Watchman] Maintain extraction capability for General Omar, detainees and friendly casualties.

Markings