Op Toxon 08 - 2026/06/20

Situation

Following OP 07, all identified Sarin containers have been accounted for. Containers assessed as unsafe to move were disposed of in place by 40 Commando, while recoverable material has been secured, removed from the area, and transferred to controlled CBRN custody. This has denied LRK immediate access to the processed Sarin, along with any stockpile of chemicals they previously recovered from the Toska convoy

The seizure of the North Eastern Airfield has placed friendly forces inside one of LRK’s most important logistics nodes in the region. The airfield was previously assessed as a site suitable for separating chemical cargo from weapons, counting captured convoy equipment, receiving buyers, and staging air defence assets. Its loss is expected to force an immediate response from LRK and IRGC-linked elements. A significant counterattack should be expected, likely supported by better-equipped militia detachments, drone teams, indirect fire, and locally recruited fighters attempting to overwhelm or isolate the airfield before friendly forces can fully consolidate.

Exploitation of the cargo vans used to transport the Sarin has produced two priority intelligence leads. The first is a company headquarters inside Al Salman East, linked to the registered ownership and movement records of the Benzyna-marked vans used during the chemical transfer. This company is now assessed to be either an LRK-controlled front or a coerced commercial entity used to mask vehicle movement, storage, and checkpoint access. The second, and more significant, lead is the town of Al Humran, approximately 1km east of Al Salman. Signals intelligence from Al Humran matches LRK communication patterns previously seen around Faysh Khabur, with additional reporting indicating a concentration of commercial computing equipment in the area. This suggests Al Humran may be acting as a communications, routing or command support site for Abu Sabr’s remaining network.

Al Salman itself is no longer assessed as being under meaningful local security control. Insurgent elements are present throughout the city, with foot patrols moving through the urban area and its bordering settlements. Military checkpoints in and around the city are assumed to have been overrun, compromised, or deliberately repurposed by LRK and associated militia elements to restrict opposing forces rather than regulate civilian movement. Any checkpoint not already secured by friendly forces should be treated as hostile or compromised until proven otherwise.

Two construction sites have also been identified as LRK-owned and tied to the same company connected to the Sarin transport vans. These sites are assessed as likely garrison locations and possible supply points, using civilian construction activity as cover to conceal weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, and other sensitive cargo among building materials, heavy machinery, packaging, and commercial storage. Given the earlier recovery of Sarin bottles from a construction site between Rahimiya and Al Salman, these locations should be treated as credible LRK infrastructure rather than incidental civilian sites.

The remaining LRK command structure is now compressed into the Al Salman area. With Rahmani, Barzani, and al-Masri detained, and Darwish’s chemical handling network disrupted, Qasim al-Haddad / Abu Sabr has lost much of the compartmentalisation that previously protected him. He is expected to rely on remaining loyalists, front companies, overrun checkpoints, construction site garrisons, and IRGC-linked support to preserve his ability to command, communicate, and escape. OP Toxon 08 is therefore assessed as the decisive action to collapse LRK’s remaining command network, deny hostile forces the ability to retake the airfield, and locate Abu Sabr before he can disperse beyond Al Salman.

Acknowledgements

• Operating elements should expect irregular contact with ambushes and sudden engagements rather than defined frontline.
• Local security forces and authorities may be compromised or report our presence, limiting operational secrecy.
• Civilian presence is dense in and around towns, increasing the likelihood of militia blending into populated areas.
• Civilian sentiment may vary by area and/or city, with some populations tolerant or hostile to our presence.

Commanders intent

Hold the North Eastern Airfield, break LRK control around Al Salman, and strike their command, communications, and supply network before Abu Sabr can escape and rebuild his network.

Tasking(s)

Map - Overview

Plan Ops - Preview | Viewer (Read only)

40 Commando & 47 Commando

• [OBJ Solitude] Secure the LRK SIGINT activity around Al Humran. Seize communications systems, commercial computing equipment and any material linking the site to Abu Sabr’s network.

  [OBJ Ledger] Raid the LRK-linked company headquarters in Al Salman East. Recover vehicle records, ledgers, servers and evidence tying the company to the transport network.
  

1st Battalion, Mercian Regiment & A Squadron, King's Royal Hussars

• Defend the North Eastern Airfield and prevent IRGC-backed forces from regaining access to the airfield.
• [OBJ Anchor Lima] Clear insurgent patrols, roadblocks and repurposed checkpoints around Al Salman. Reopen movement routes and prevent hostile forces from reinforcing the city.
• [OBJ Anchor Mike] Assault the LRK-owned construction sites. Destroy or seize hidden weapons, ammunition, supply stores and equipment concealed among construction material.
  
• [OBJ Anchor November] Seize the insurgent-held military garrison.

Joint Aviation Command

• [OBJ Solitude] Provide transport and infil to 40 Commando
• Maintain ISR over Al Salman, Al Humran and the airfield approaches. Provide CAS, interdiction, resupply and CASEVAC in support of all ground elements.

Markings